In international politics, denial can occasionally be part of the game. US President Donald Trump has officially denied requesting Chinese mediation regarding Iran during his recent visit to Beijing. Yet the timing of the visit, the nature of the issues discussed, and the simultaneous escalation in the Gulf have all prompted observers to ask a larger question: Is Washington beginning to view China as a partner that can no longer be bypassed in managing Middle Eastern crises?

From this perspective, Trump’s visit to Beijing was not merely a historic encounter between two strategic rivals or a diplomatic showcase between two great powers. It reflected a deeper transformation unfolding within the international system itself. The shift is neither the collapse of America, as some imagine, nor the rise of China as a traditional replacement empire. Rather, it lies in the changing nature of power itself. Today, power is no longer measured solely by military capabilities, but also by the ability to influence markets, energy flows, supply chains, and networks of economic dependency.

Even without an officially declared mediation request, the mere linkage between Beijing, Washington, and the Iranian file reveals an undeniable reality: China has become too influential to ignore in Middle Eastern calculations. Washington, which for decades acted as the sole power capable of shaping regional balances, now finds itself operating in a world where other actors possess genuine leverage in one of the most strategically sensitive regions on earth.

China today is not merely a trading partner for Tehran; it is a vital economic artery. It is the largest importer of Iranian oil, has massive strategic investments under the Belt and Road Initiative, and holds the ability to grant Tehran economic breathing space in the face of Western sanctions. This makes Beijing—unlike many other international powers—capable of addressing Iran in the language of interests, not threats alone.

However, reading the scene as a “complete Chinese victory” would be a superficial and hasty interpretation. China itself does not—at least not yet—seek to lead the world according to the traditional American model. Beijing is highly aware that any direct confrontation with Washington could threaten the global economic stability upon which its rise depends. Therefore, China’s strategy is based on quiet expansion: economic influence, commercial penetration, long-term investments, and flexible alliances, without engaging in large-scale military adventures.

As for Trump, he operates with a mindset different from that of classical American administrations. He does not place much faith in ideological alliances or grand slogans about democracy and human rights; he believes in the language of “the deal.” His political approach is deeply pragmatic: reducing tensions when necessary, protecting economic interests, and avoiding disruptions that could destabilize energy markets or global trade flows.

Yet behind this pragmatism lies a larger, undeniable truth: America is no longer able to manage the world single-handedly as it did after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, Washington acted as the “sole pole,” capable of imposing sanctions, igniting wars, and building international coalitions without needing genuine understandings with rival powers. Today, the landscape is entirely different.

The war in Ukraine exposed the limits of Western power. The escalation in the Middle East revealed the fragility of global energy markets. Meanwhile, China’s economic rise has created a web of mutual dependencies that makes isolating or bypassing Beijing extremely difficult. The world is gradually transforming into a more complex system in which centers of influence are distributed among Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and rising regional powers.

Most importantly, the Middle East itself is no longer what it once was. Countries in the region have become more pragmatic and more capable of diversifying their alliances. Saudi Arabia cooperates economically with China while maintaining its security partnership with America. The UAE moves flexibly between East and West. Turkey plays a balancing role between Russia and NATO. Even Iran itself is increasingly looking eastward.

In this context, Egypt stands before an important strategic opportunity. A multipolar world grants Cairo wider space for political and economic maneuver, away from the logic of sharp polarization. Egyptian-Chinese relations are expanding economically, while the security and military partnership with the United States continues. This ability to balance may become one of the most significant factors in Egypt’s strength in the coming years.

However, multipolarity does not necessarily mean greater stability. Sometimes a unipolar world is more predictable, while competition between major powers can lead to prolonged crises and open contests of influence. The real danger lies not in China’s rise alone, but in the absence of clear rules to regulate relations between the great powers in the coming phase.

The question that imposes itself here is not: “Has American hegemony ended?” but rather: “How will America behave in a world it no longer controls alone?”

Washington recognizes that Beijing has become its most serious economic competitor, yet it also understands that China’s role in global energy markets, trade networks, and regional diplomacy cannot simply be ignored. This complex relationship of rivalry and selective cooperation may become the defining feature of international politics over the next decade.

As for Iran, it is well aware of the value of its position within this equation. The higher the tension in the Gulf, the greater the importance of the Iranian role, and the greater the need for major powers to negotiate with it, directly or indirectly. Therefore, Tehran will likely continue using its regional pressure cards cautiously, without risking an all-out confrontation that could threaten the regime’s survival.

The Strait of Hormuz remains the true heart of the crisis. It is not merely a waterway, but a global energy artery through which a significant share of oil and gas exports flows. Any disruption there threatens not only the Gulf but the entire global economy. This is why the whole world watches this small area with anxiety that sometimes surpasses attention to the wars themselves.

In the end, Trump’s visit to Beijing may not be an official announcement of the end of the American era. Still, it is certainly a practical acknowledgment that the world has entered a new phase: a phase in which no power—no matter how strong—can manage international balances alone.

And perhaps this is the most important message the visit carried, far from official statements and diplomatic photographs: The world is changing… slowly, but profoundly.

Dr. Marwa El-Shinawy, Academic and Writer

The post Opinion | Trump’s Visit to Beijing Raises the Question: Is Washington Recognizing a Post-Unipolar World? first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

Trump posted on his Truth Social platform late on Saturday an image of warships, including a boat carrying the Iranian flag, alongside the phrase “The calm before the storm,” in what observers viewed as a possible signal of looming military action against Iran, particularly around the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz.

The post came shortly after Trump returned from China, where he discussed the Iran war and other global issues with Chinese President Xi Jinping, amid growing international pressure on Washington to avoid a broader regional conflict.

Tehran responded sharply. Iranian armed forces spokesperson Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi warned that any new attack on Iran would result in the United States receiving “even harsher and more severe blows,” adding that American interests and forces would face “new and devastating attack scenarios” if Washington acted on its threats.

Iran’s defense ministry spokesperson Reza Talaei Nik also said Iranian armed forces were “fully prepared to respond to any threat or aggression,” as Tehran intensified both military and political messaging regarding Gulf shipping security.

Iranian state television announced new procedures for ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz, requiring ship owners to submit transit requests through their foreign ministries to Iran’s foreign ministry, which would then forward them to the Revolutionary Guards navy for evaluation of the vessel’s route, ownership and cargo. Transit permission would be granted only if the vessel was not linked to a “hostile state.”

The move points to unprecedented Iranian tightening of shipping controls in the strait, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil trade passes, raising renewed concerns over maritime security and energy supplies.

In a separate development, the UAE defense ministry said its air defenses dealt with three drones entering the country’s airspace from the western border area. Two drones were intercepted, while the third struck a power generator outside the inner perimeter of the Barakah nuclear power plant in the Al Dhafra region, though no casualties were reported.

The ministry said investigations were underway to determine the source of the attack and stressed that the armed forces remained on full alert to confront threats targeting the country’s security.

South Korea’s foreign ministry said Foreign Minister Cho Hyun sought clarification from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqchi over an attack on a South Korean cargo ship near the Strait of Hormuz. A South Korean official was quoted as saying the likelihood that another party besides Iran was responsible was “low.”

In Israel, Yedioth Ahronoth reported that the Israeli military had moved to maximum alert over the possibility of renewed war with Iran, adding that the government was awaiting Trump’s decision amid growing assessments that Tehran may reject U.S. conditions for ending the conflict and addressing Iran’s nuclear program.

The newspaper also said the United States and Israel were “strongly preparing” for the possible resumption of hostilities, echoing an earlier New York Times report that the Pentagon was preparing for renewed war because key U.S. objectives — especially concerning Iran’s nuclear program — had not been achieved.

At the same time, Tehran sought to project domestic unity and regional backing. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian told Pakistan’s interior minister that the United States and Israel had aimed to “topple the regime” but had failed to anticipate that the Iranian people would stand by their country and government. He also praised Pakistan’s role in helping sustain the ceasefire and expressed hope that Islamabad’s efforts would support regional peace.

As mutual threats continue, shipping restrictions tighten and military readiness increases across the region, fears are growing that the current ceasefire may prove only a temporary pause in a conflict whose core disputes remain unresolved.

The post Trump again signals military option against Iran amid Hormuz tensions first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

The reliance on deceptive maritime practices to circumvent the blockade, which was imposed in mid-April to choke off Tehran’s oil revenues and restrict its regional financing, comes as the US Navy deploys extensive forces to the region. China remains the world’s largest importer of Iranian oil, and the ongoing trade coincides with recent meetings between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The continued flow of crude has prompted US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to accuse Beijing of “effectively funding terrorism” by maintaining its purchases of Iranian oil, according to the New York Times.

To grant Washington the capacity to monitor and intercept Asia-bound vessels, the US Navy has pushed significant forces into the region, beginning in the Gulf of Oman. US officials state the blockade has achieved substantial results, with more than 70 vessels intercepted since operations commenced. These include interventions near the Iranian coast and at significant distances in the Indian Ocean. Notably, US forces seized the tanker Majestic X, which was carrying an Iranian oil cargo destined for China, more than 2,000 miles from the Gulf of Oman.

However, a New York Times analysis of shipping data and satellite imagery demonstrates that several oil-laden vessels departing Iranian ports concurrently with or following the blockade’s implementation have successfully maintained their routes to East Asia.

Sophisticated Concealment Tactics

To evade detection, these vessels employ a variety of concealment methods, including deactivating tracking devices, spoofing geographical locations, sailing under false flags, and conducting ship-to-ship transfers at sea to obscure the true origin of the cargo. According to maritime intelligence firm Windward, the number of vessels utilising such deceptive practices surged by 600% between April 19 and May 3.

A prominent example is the Iranian supertanker Huge, which loaded approximately 2m barrels of crude from Kharg Island, Iran’s primary export terminal, before crossing the Strait of Hormuz in early April. Satellite imagery indicates the vessel departed the Gulf of Oman around April 13, almost exactly as the US blockade was enforced. The tanker kept its tracker deactivated for nearly its entire journey, briefly switching it on in early May when it appeared off the Indonesian coast in the Lombok Strait.

Captain Tim Hawkins, a spokesperson for US Central Command, stated that Washington does not consider the Huge to have evaded the blockade, as its crossing predated official enforcement. Conversely, the New York Times noted that US forces intercepted and seized another vessel carrying Iranian crude, the MT Tiffany, in the Indian Ocean on April 21, despite it also leaving the Gulf of Oman prior to the blockade’s imposition.

Satellite imagery tracked the Huge near Sri Lanka on April 23 before it continued north along the Vietnamese coast, with estimates suggesting it is bound for China or waters near Hong Kong. The vessel’s route is significant as it navigated the Indonesian Lombok Strait rather than the more frequently used Malacca Strait. Ami Daniel, chief executive of Windward, observed that an increasing number of Iran-linked vessels are adopting this route to minimise detection.

Describing the level of US focus on the blockade as “unprecedented,” Daniel added: “I do not think a 300-metre tanker can leave the Strait of Hormuz without being detected.” He suggested that some vessels successfully transiting the region may have secured understandings or waivers from US authorities for humanitarian or other considerations.

Electronic Spoofing and Covert Transfers

The US-sanctioned tanker Atomis utilised electronic spoofing to mask its location while loading Iranian crude. On April 2, tracking data positioned the vessel in Kuwait, whilst satellite imagery confirmed its presence at Kharg Island. The ship, which was falsely flying the Comoros flag, changed its name from Davit to Atomis just one day before crossing the US blockade zone.

Captain Hawkins asserted that electronic spoofing operations have not impeded the US Navy’s enforcement capabilities, noting that Washington relies on multiple monitoring means, including radio frequency data and radar-based satellite imagery. Analysts project the Atomis, which continued its journey across the Indian Ocean to a waiting area near Hong Kong, will likely transfer its cargo to another vessel.

Smaller vessels are proving highly manoeuvrable, frequently executing ship-to-ship transfers at sea. The US does not classify these transfers as a direct violation of the blockade, which prioritises vessels entering or exiting Iranian ports. The Salute Legend, a small Hong Kong-flagged tanker, used spoofing techniques to disguise its true location. According to a Lloyd’s List report, the vessel likely received Iranian oil from another tanker in the Gulf of Oman before sailing east to the Chinese port of Quanzhou.

The analysis indicates at least eight small Iran-linked vessels have departed the Gulf of Oman for Asia since the blockade began, with half believed to have engaged in ship-to-ship oil transfers in the Gulf or off the Malaysian coast. The waters near Malaysia have served as a primary hub for covert Iranian oil transfers for several years.

Floating Storage Declines

Despite the continued flow of some shipments to Asia, analysts assess the US blockade is actively impacting the volume of Iranian oil stored on vessels at sea.

According to data from Kpler, a global crude tracking firm, the volume of Iranian oil stored on tankers off the coast of Malaysia has dropped from approximately 85m barrels in early February to 51m barrels currently. This decline indicatesthat a significant portion of the floating inventory is no longer being replenished with fresh shipments at its previous pace.

The post Iranian tankers use ‘unprecedented’ evasion methods to bypass US Gulf blockade first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

Speaking in a Fox News interview broadcast on Friday following his visit to Beijing, Trump stated that the arms deal remains under review. “I have not approved it yet, and we will see what happens. I am keeping it on hold for now, and the matter depends on China,” he said, adding that the proposed sale is “a very good bargaining chip for us, frankly.. it is a large amount of weapons.”

The US president described the status of Taiwan as the “most important file for the Chinese president” and noted that the issue dominated their summit discussions. Emphasising that Beijing “does not want to see Taiwan independent,” Trump predicted that China would take “very strong steps” should Taipei move in that direction.

“They will face a harsh response, and bad things will happen,” Trump said. He highlighted the geographic disparity as a “difficult problem,” noting that Taiwan is situated approximately 59 miles from China, whereas the United States is about 9,500 miles away.

Trump also accused Taiwan of “stealing” the American microchip industry, asserting that previous US administrations allowed semiconductor manufacturing companies to leave the country. “If we had imposed tariffs of 100% or 200% on chips coming into the United States, we would not have lost this industry,” he stated, adding that the sector is “returning now” to the US. He subsequently called on both Beijing and Taipei to de-escalate tensions, stating: “It would be smart for Taiwan to calm down a little, and it would also be smart for China to calm down a little.. both sides should calm down.”

Prior to his interview, a Chinese government spokeswoman stated that “the Taiwan issue is the most important issue in relations between China and the United States,” warning that improper handling could lead to “clashes and even conflicts” between the two nations. The status of Taiwan, located 80 kilometres off the Chinese coast, has historically strained bilateral relations; Beijing refuses to rule out the use of force to take control of the island, whilst Washington is bound by law to provide Taipei with the means for its defence.

Trade Agreements and AI Supremacy

Reflecting on his meetings in Beijing, Trump said “the relationship was the most important thing” he took away from the summit. “It is all about the relationship. I have a very good relationship with President Xi, and with China,” he noted.

He characterised trade relations between the two countries as “very strong,” announcing that China has committed to increasing its purchases of US soybeans and acquiring commercial aircraft from Boeing. Trump specified that Xi pledged to purchase 200 large Boeing aircraft, including 777 and 737 models. He added that this figure could rise to 750 aircraft if “Boeing and General Electric engines perform well.”

Beyond trade, artificial intelligence was a central focus of the bilateral talks. Trump asserted that the United States “excels by a large margin” over China in the sector. He disclosed that the two leaders discussed the possibility of establishing “controls” to regulate the development of AI.

Describing artificial intelligence as “mostly a wonderful thing,” Trump stated he has granted AI companies the right to construct their own power stations to secure necessary energy requirements, a move he claims has bolstered the US lead over China. “Very rich companies led by many geniuses” have already begun building these power plants, he said.

Trump noted that the global competition in artificial intelligence is “primarily concentrated” between the US and China. “Who will win the artificial intelligence race? We will win it,” he declared. He added that Xi was “surprised” by the extent of American progress, explaining that Beijing initially believed it held a “massive lead,” but that the US had “caught up, and is now clearly ahead of it.”

Putin to Seek Briefings in Beijing

Following Trump’s departure, Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit China on Wednesday and Thursday. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov highlighted the significance of communication between the world’s two largest economies, stating on Friday that Russia expects to receive direct information from China regarding its talks with the United States during Putin’s visit.

The Kremlin announced in a statement that Putin’s visit, taking place at Xi’s invitation, coincides with the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, which it described as “fundamental to relations between the two states.” The 2001 agreement, signed by Putin and former Chinese President Jiang Zemin, established a long-term strategic partnership and structured economic cooperation across multiple sectors, according to Bloomberg.

Putin and Xi are expected to discuss bilateral relations and exchange views on prominent international and regional issues. Bloomberg reported that following the talks, the two sides are scheduled to sign a joint statement alongside a number of bilateral governmental agreements and other documents. Putin will also hold discussions with Chinese Premier Li Qiang regarding trade and economic cooperation.

The South China Morning Post reported previously, citing unnamed sources, that the visit is unlikely to feature formal ceremonies such as a military parade.

The trip marks Putin’s first foreign visit of the year, underscoring the close alignment between Beijing and Moscow. The two nations view one another as essential partners in a broader effort to challenge the US-led global order. Last month, Xi praised the stability of relations with Moscow and pledged to enhance bilateral coordination during a meeting with the Russian foreign minister. In early May, Putin stated that the two countries had “agreed in principle” on a high level of serious cooperation in the oil and gas sectors, adding that he intends to discuss nuclear energy with Xi during the upcoming summit.

The post Trump suspends $14bn Taiwan arms sale as ‘bargaining chip’, warns Taipei against independence bids first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

Arriving from Singapore, the bulk carrier measures 289 metres in length and 45 metres in width, with a draught of 16 metres. The port authority stated that the successful reception of the deep-draught vessel reflects the readiness of the navigation channel and marine berths.

Port Authority Chairperson Tarek Adly Abdallah attributed the capacity to accommodate this load to recent development plans, which included deepening the navigation channel and berths, modernising marine services, and improving handling operations. He also noted the role of the authority’s pilots, marine service crews, and mooring workers in executing the piloting, towing, berthing, and mooring operations for the large vessel.

The cargo unloading will be carried out using equipment belonging to Sisco Trans for Advanced Logistics, in coordination with the port authority and relevant entities to manage the handling and discharge processes.

The port’s upgrades are part of a broader Ministry of Transport plan, directed by Minister of Transport Kamel El-Wazir, to develop Egyptian ports and raise their operational and competitive capacity. The initiative aligns with state directives to establish Egypt as a regional centre for transport, logistics, and transit trade, supporting the handling of bulk and general cargo.

The post Egypt’s Damietta Port receives its largest bulk cargo of 144,780 tonnes on YANG FAN vessel first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

This relationship matters because it directly influences the balance of power in the Middle East, a region where new international trends are often tested. The key question is not whether a formal alliance exists, but how this flexible mix of interests reshapes power and stability in the region.

Such cooperation challenges traditional ideas about deterrence. In recent years, Iran has sought closer ties with Russia and China to counterbalance US influence. Yet these relationships do not guarantee support in times of crisis. Instead, they create an uncertain security environment, where assistance is not assured and outcomes remain unpredictable.

This uncertainty grants regional powers greater independence. Without rigid alliances, Middle Eastern states can engage with multiple major powers without fully committing to any single bloc. As a result, the region has become a competitive arena where countries respond to shifting interests and pursue diverse partnerships. This has produced a fragile and easily disrupted stability.

In the past, the region enjoyed a more structured balance. Today, crises are managed rather than resolved. Major powers such as Russia and China aim to prevent escalation but avoid costly or risky commitments. This approach seeks to maintain stability and avert conflict, yet underlying tensions persist.

Russia and China focus on managing regional crises—including those involving Iran—rather than pursuing comprehensive solutions. Russia seeks to limit further complications given its own challenges and the war in Ukraine. China, meanwhile, prioritizes safeguarding its economy and energy security, while steering clear of direct military involvement. This strategy may prevent deterioration but does not address deeper structural issues.

By managing crises instead of resolving them, Russia and China maintain a degree of control and stability in the region. Their relationship with Iran remains flexible, allowing each side to pursue its own interests without binding defense commitments.

This flexible approach has significant implications. Rather than a single dominant power imposing order, the Middle East now operates within a complex web of overlapping relationships. Power struggles persist, but with multiple strong actors involved, outcomes are harder to predict.

Consequently, the region is more susceptible to sudden shifts, while states enjoy greater freedom to adapt to new circumstances. The environment remains fluid, with numerous players shaping and reacting to events. Rapid change is the norm, forcing countries to continually reassess strategies and partnerships. Traditional frameworks for understanding these dynamics no longer suffice. Today, relationships are driven by shifting interests rather than fixed alliances or ideologies. Even when divisions appear to deepen, they may not reflect enduring realities.

Dr. Marwa El-Shinawy – Academic and Writer

The post Opinion | Intersecting Interests of Russia, China, and Iran: Implications for the Middle East’s Balance of Power first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

Daily News Egypt sat down with Steve Lutes, Vice President of the US Chamber of Commerce for Middle East Affairs, to explore the realities of US-Egypt economic ties and the challenges of turning Egypt’s potential into execution.

How do you assess Egypt’s performance in attracting investment? What is needed to improve?

Every government faces the challenge of becoming an attractive destination. Egypt already enjoys advantages that are difficult to replicate, most notably its geographic location. The key question is how to fully leverage that position.

Egypt also benefits from trade agreements with African markets. While I am not an economist, many experts anticipate strong growth across Africa in the coming years, which presents a significant opportunity. We often speak about Egypt as a gateway to Africa, but the priority now is to translate that concept into practical reality. This requires expanding dialogue frameworks beyond bilateral engagement to more multilateral cooperation.

What role can the US Chamber play in promoting economic support for Egypt?

The Chamber maintains ongoing engagement with US policymakers to highlight Egypt’s strategic economic importance, its role in regional stability, and its value as a trade and investment partner, particularly amid rising geopolitical tensions.

Through the US-Egypt Business Council, we consistently advocate for strengthening economic resilience, ensuring market stability, and supporting private sector-led growth. During periods of crisis, we also communicate the impact of economic shocks on supply chains, investor confidence, and reform trajectories. This helps foster a more stable political and economic environment conducive to financing and sustainable investment.

There’s a perception that Egypt’s private sector lacks equal opportunity. How do you see it?

There is always room for improvement; no system is perfect. From what I hear, there is clear government intent to expand privatisation and strengthen the private sector’s role. Naturally, businesses would like to see this process move faster.

Recent government changes suggest a greater willingness to accelerate reforms. This is creating more opportunities for private sector participation across a range of industries, whether through domestic firms or partnerships with international companies, including American ones.

With China, Türkiye, Germany, and Russia active in Egypt, where does the US stand?

It is important to recognise that different countries operate under different economic models. China and, to a large extent, Russia rely on state-led investment approaches. The United States operates very differently.

The US government does not direct companies where to invest. Decisions are made by private firms based on market conditions. If the investment environment is attractive, companies will come. If not, they will look elsewhere.

Can Egypt truly become a regional hub?

Absolutely. Egypt has the potential to serve not only as a gateway to Africa, but also to the Mediterranean and Europe. The Suez Canal remains a critical artery for global trade, whether for goods, energy, or even digital connectivity through submarine cables.

However, the real challenge is not promotion; it is execution.

What do you mean by execution?

Attracting American investment requires a more tailored approach than in state-led systems. In countries like China, agreements are often concluded at the government level, with companies following.

In the United States, each company must be engaged individually. Some are looking to expand into Africa, others have capital ready to deploy, while others require detailed feasibility studies. This makes the process more complex and demands targeted engagement and customised analysis.

Does this make US investment more difficult to secure?

It does make it more demanding, but also more sustainable. American companies tend to take a long-term view. They invest in local hiring, integrate into the market, and build enduring business operations.

What can we expect from the second Egyptian-American Economic Forum?

The objective is to frame the relationship strategically, rather than as a one-off event. There is a real opportunity to reinforce Egypt’s role as a gateway to Africa, including by involving African stakeholders and presenting concrete, investment-ready projects.

How can interest be converted into real investment?

American firms require precise, actionable information, not general messaging. When opportunities are clearly defined and well-structured, it becomes much easier to convert interest into investment.

Sector-focused discussions and direct engagement are essential to this process.

Why has Egypt-US cooperation in Africa been limited?

The Chamber continues to view Egypt as a key platform for US companies seeking to expand into Africa, particularly in sectors such as logistics, construction, energy, agriculture, and services.

However, progress depends on clearer project pipelines, the use of innovative financing tools such as blended finance, and stronger coordination between governments and development institutions.

What guarantees do US investors seek in tech and infrastructure?

Investors prioritise regulatory stability, transparency, effective dispute resolution mechanisms, and the availability of foreign currency. They also look for clear frameworks for public-private partnerships and predictable licensing timelines.

In the technology sector, data governance, intellectual property protection, and cybersecurity are especially critical.

Beyond energy, which sectors are most attractive?

Key growth areas include logistics, ICT, fintech, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, and export-oriented manufacturing.

What is the Chamber’s vision for the future of the Egypt-US economic partnership?

The relationship is evolving into a more strategic partnership built on resilience, innovation, and shared responsibility. Key areas of focus include energy security, regional stability, supply chain diversification, and human capital development.

The post Egypt poised to become gateway to Africa, Europe: Steve Lutes first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

It is no coincidence that Iran, following Venezuela, has been targeted by US President Donald Trump; both countries collectively supply China with nearly 20% of its effective oil imports. These flows provide Beijing with price security and a degree of insulation from Western pressures, rendering them a strategic asset in its economic confrontation with Washington.

Undoubtedly, the blockade is primarily aimed at Iran, further exacerbating its economic strain. More than 90% of its maritime trade—both oil and non-oil—passes through the Strait of Hormuz, while its options for circumventing the blockade remain extremely limited. Should the blockade be effectively enforced, prolonged export disruptions and an inability to offload crude oil would pose a tangible operational risk to Iran’s oil fields. Once onshore storage capacities and available tankers reach saturation, forced well shutdowns may become unavoidable.

In such scenarios, aging fields may face technical risks related to reservoir integrity and declining production efficiency, potentially leading to irreversible damage. Under the weight of such losses, Tehran may resort to escalatory measures designed to raise the cost of the crisis for all parties. Among these, environmental or maritime contamination in the vicinity of the strait—reminiscent of the aftermath of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait—cannot be ruled out, with the aim of disrupting navigation and driving up global insurance and shipping costs.

Conversely, the US blockade also serves broader strategic purposes within its economic confrontation with Beijing in the Gulf region, which has increasingly become an arena of competition between the two powers. The rivalry is no longer confined to energy contracts; it now encompasses technology, renewable energy, digital currencies, and the so-called “corridors of the future,” of which the Strait of Hormuz is a critical node.

Estimates for 2026 suggest that trade between Gulf states and China is on track to exceed $325 billion by next year, surpassing the combined total of Gulf trade with the United States and Europe. China is no longer merely an energy consumer; it has become the leading technological partner in national development visions—such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030—particularly in smart infrastructure sectors. The United States, in turn, is attempting to counterbalance this influence through strategic initiatives such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), positioned as a direct competitor to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Washington has also exerted sustained pressure on Gulf states to curtail cooperation with Huawei in the domains of 5G networks and cloud computing, citing security risks to US military bases in the region—a clear red line for American policymakers. Meanwhile, Beijing has successfully secured agreements to construct large-scale data centres in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, thereby consolidating its influence in the “big data” sector, which Washington likewise views as an intelligence threat.

The year 2025 witnessed an acceleration in the use of local currencies for settling energy transactions, with some oil and gas shipments between China and Gulf states already denominated in the digital yuan. While the US dollar remains dominant, the mere existence of a viable Chinese technological alternative diminishes the effectiveness of American sanctions as a geopolitical tool—an evolution that Washington is monitoring with growing concern, given its implications for the global financial order.

In the first quarter of this year, Gulf sovereign wealth funds showed a discernible shift toward increasing investments in Chinese technology firms, while Beijing moved to localize electric vehicle manufacturing within the region.

Since Trump’s return to the White House, a primary objective has been to curb China’s accelerating technological ascent. The crises he has ignited in Venezuela and Iran—both capable of inflicting immediate and substantial damage on the Chinese economy through disruptions in oil supplies—have, paradoxically, revealed China’s preparedness to convert such challenges into opportunities. Beijing has leveraged these dynamics to reinforce its leadership in renewable energy technologies and to entrench itself as a global political power capable of filling the vacuum left by military conflicts.

China has not only managed the economic repercussions of the crisis through reliance on its strategic reserves but has also demonstrated political dexterity. From a pragmatic standpoint, it has exerted pressure on Iran to engage in negotiations in Islamabad, despite the fact that a prolonged US entanglement in the Gulf could theoretically expand China’s strategic manoeuvrability regarding its claim over Taiwan—the world’s leading producer of semiconductors. This is not a contradiction; rather, it reflects a calculated pursuit of a “controlled conflict” that exhausts the adversary without escalating into a direct confrontation that could jeopardize China’s commercial interests.

This assessment is reinforced by a recent report issued in April by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, which concluded that the US Air Force no longer possesses sufficient capacity to prevail in a direct conflict with China. The report attributes this condition to decades of underinvestment and delays in modernization programs, resulting in a fighter fleet lacking the range and survivability required to maintain air superiority against a peer competitor.

The current confrontation is no longer about “who buys oil,” but about “who sets the technological and financial rules of the region.” The intervention of China’s defence minister underscores Beijing’s recognition that the security of maritime corridors is inseparable from the security of its strategic connectivity projects, foremost among them the Belt and Road Initiative, through which China seeks to link Asia with Europe and Africa via an integrated network of land and sea routes.

The crisis surrounding the blockade and the Strait of Hormuz simultaneously advances immediate US objectives vis-à-vis Iran and broader strategic aims in its rivalry with China within the framework of “corridor competition.” What we are witnessing is the apex of global geopolitical and economic rivalry, where geopolitics has evolved from a contest over territory to a contest over connectivity; over corridors, data, energy, and supply chains.

Prof. Hatem Sadek – Helwan University

The post Opinion | The Struggle over ‘Corridors of the Future’ first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian said the Iranian people would “not bow to force,” adding that honouring commitments is “the justified logic of any dialogue.” His remarks signalled that Tehran views any diplomatic breakthrough as contingent on concrete guarantees rather than political messaging alone. He also pointed to recent US actions, alongside a long history of strained relations, as reinforcing perceptions that Washington is seeking capitulation rather than a balanced agreement.

In Washington, a source familiar with the matter told Reuters that JD Vance, the American vice president, remained in the US and had not yet departed for Pakistan, despite earlier indications from US President Donald Trump that a delegation would travel to Islamabad ahead of the ceasefire deadline in the coming days. The source added that while the delegation had not yet left, plans to travel remained in place.

Reuters also cited a senior Iranian official as saying Tehran was “seriously and positively” considering participation in potential talks, although no final decision had been reached. The official noted that Pakistan is working to ease the US blockade on Iranian ports, an issue Tehran views as a major barrier to re-engagement. Two days earlier, Iran’s deputy foreign minister said no date had been set for the next round of discussions, emphasising the need to first establish a “framework of understanding.”

The contrast between cautious openness from some Iranian officials and firmer public rhetoric elsewhere suggests Tehran is seeking to preserve negotiating space without appearing to concede under military or economic pressure. It also points to unresolved disputes, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian port access, remaining central to the diplomatic impasse.

Meanwhile, China called for an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire and urged the maintenance of normal shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, amid growing international concern over the crisis’s impact on global energy markets and supply chains.

The Kremlin said it hoped negotiations would continue and that all parties would avoid a return to military confrontation, adding that Russia is not acting as a mediator but remains ready to assist if needed.

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The financial results, compared to a net profit of approximately EGP 340m in 2023, reflect the implementation of the company’s 2024-2028 institutional development strategy, WADICO Chairperson Amgad Abdel Razek Ghoneim said during the company’s general assembly. The meeting was held via videoconference to approve the 2025 results and was attended by Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Karim Badawi.

Total company assets rose 283% from 2023 to reach EGP 3.14bn.

Operationally, WADICO extracted 3.5m tonnes of phosphate ore in 2025, reaching a daily extraction rate of 10,000 tonnes. The production of fine phosphate using mechanical separation totalled 1.7m tonnes, with a daily average of 4.6 thousand tonnes, resulting in sales of 1.1m tonnes, Ghoneim said.

Expanded exploration programmes have confirmed new phosphate reserves, which, alongside current measured and proven stock, guarantee sustainable production and sales rates for more than eight years, he added.

In a bid to expand its operations locally and internationally, WADICO signed a strategic memorandum of understanding(MoU) with Chinese firm Xingfa to study the establishment of an integrated chemical industrial complex for phosphorus and silicon production in Egypt. The company is also in discussions to exploit phosphate in Saudi Arabia and has signed an MoU for phosphate exploration in Mauritania.

As part of its green mining initiatives, WADICO is constructing the Egyptian mining sector’s first off-grid solar power plant in Aswan’s Wadi Al-Shaghab region. The 3.2-megawatt facility will power three crusher production lines and associated facilities, saving 2.6m litres of diesel annually and reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 7.3 thousand tonnes.

The company has also deployed the sector’s first electric heavy mining equipment, operating three 70-tonne dump trucks and two 24-tonne loaders, supported by a 600-kilowatt-hour electric charging station.

On digital transformation, WADICO achieved “zero human intervention” in its production stages by linking all weighing scales to an enterprise resource planning (ERP) system and a central dashboard providing real-time data and alerts, the chairman said. The digital upgrade included integrating artificial intelligence, establishing VOIP telecommunications infrastructure, and deploying solar-powered surveillance cameras for round-the-clock automated risk monitoring.

Additionally, WADICO issued a safety guide for supervisors of surface mining operations for sedimentary ores, detailing equipment protocols, risk identification, and precautionary measures to limit hazards.

The post Egypt’s WADICO reports 2025 net profit exceeding EGP 1bn, signs MoU with China’s Xingfa first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.