Speaking at the White House on Wednesday, Trump said the United States “will not allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon,” adding that Washington had “strong support” for its position. He announced what he described as a strengthened naval blockade, referred to as the “Steel Wall.”

Trump said the United States would “seize more Iranian oil tankers,” adding that “no one can break through the naval blockade” imposed on Iran and that additional Iranian vessels “will be intercepted unless Tehran shows real commitment and changes its behaviour.”

Addressing lawmakers at the White House, Trump also said the United States would “end the war very quickly” with Iran, reiterating that Tehran would not be permitted to possess nuclear weapons.

Iran’s foreign ministry, however, said Tehran was currently focused on “ending the war on all fronts, especially Lebanon,” while insisting it continued negotiations “in good faith.” The ministry said Washington must demonstrate seriousness in any diplomatic process.

The ministry described the US naval measures as “a violation of the ceasefire and contrary to international law,” dismissing discussions of ultimatums or deadlines imposed on Iran as “ridiculous.”

It added that coastal states have the right to prevent “aggressor states” from crossing the Strait of Hormuz and called for mechanisms regulating passage through the strategic waterway to ensure maritime security and environmental protection. Tehran also demanded the release of frozen Iranian assets and an end to what it described as “maritime piracy against Iranian shipping.”

In a further escalation, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards warned that any renewed attack on Iran would not remain confined within its borders. In a statement carried by Tasnim news agency, the Guards said the “American-Zionist enemy” had failed to learn from repeated strategic defeats, adding that Iran had “not yet used all of its capabilities” despite confronting the United States and Israel.

Iranian state television later reported that five large oil tankers had received authorisation from the Revolutionary Guards to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, highlighting continued tensions surrounding one of the world’s most critical energy shipping routes.

Elsewhere in the region, Jordan’s military said it had shot down an unidentified drone that entered the country’s airspace over Jerash province on Wednesday morning, adding that there were no casualties and only minor material damage.

In the Gulf, the United Arab Emirates called on Iraq to prevent “any hostile acts” launched from its territory following a recent drone attack targeting the UAE’s Barakah nuclear power plant. In a statement, the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged Baghdad to take immediate and unconditional action to prevent “all hostile acts originating from its territory” and address the threats responsibly in accordance with international law.

The post Trump escalates naval pressure as Iran accuses US of breaching ceasefire first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

In international politics, denial can occasionally be part of the game. US President Donald Trump has officially denied requesting Chinese mediation regarding Iran during his recent visit to Beijing. Yet the timing of the visit, the nature of the issues discussed, and the simultaneous escalation in the Gulf have all prompted observers to ask a larger question: Is Washington beginning to view China as a partner that can no longer be bypassed in managing Middle Eastern crises?

From this perspective, Trump’s visit to Beijing was not merely a historic encounter between two strategic rivals or a diplomatic showcase between two great powers. It reflected a deeper transformation unfolding within the international system itself. The shift is neither the collapse of America, as some imagine, nor the rise of China as a traditional replacement empire. Rather, it lies in the changing nature of power itself. Today, power is no longer measured solely by military capabilities, but also by the ability to influence markets, energy flows, supply chains, and networks of economic dependency.

Even without an officially declared mediation request, the mere linkage between Beijing, Washington, and the Iranian file reveals an undeniable reality: China has become too influential to ignore in Middle Eastern calculations. Washington, which for decades acted as the sole power capable of shaping regional balances, now finds itself operating in a world where other actors possess genuine leverage in one of the most strategically sensitive regions on earth.

China today is not merely a trading partner for Tehran; it is a vital economic artery. It is the largest importer of Iranian oil, has massive strategic investments under the Belt and Road Initiative, and holds the ability to grant Tehran economic breathing space in the face of Western sanctions. This makes Beijing—unlike many other international powers—capable of addressing Iran in the language of interests, not threats alone.

However, reading the scene as a “complete Chinese victory” would be a superficial and hasty interpretation. China itself does not—at least not yet—seek to lead the world according to the traditional American model. Beijing is highly aware that any direct confrontation with Washington could threaten the global economic stability upon which its rise depends. Therefore, China’s strategy is based on quiet expansion: economic influence, commercial penetration, long-term investments, and flexible alliances, without engaging in large-scale military adventures.

As for Trump, he operates with a mindset different from that of classical American administrations. He does not place much faith in ideological alliances or grand slogans about democracy and human rights; he believes in the language of “the deal.” His political approach is deeply pragmatic: reducing tensions when necessary, protecting economic interests, and avoiding disruptions that could destabilize energy markets or global trade flows.

Yet behind this pragmatism lies a larger, undeniable truth: America is no longer able to manage the world single-handedly as it did after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, Washington acted as the “sole pole,” capable of imposing sanctions, igniting wars, and building international coalitions without needing genuine understandings with rival powers. Today, the landscape is entirely different.

The war in Ukraine exposed the limits of Western power. The escalation in the Middle East revealed the fragility of global energy markets. Meanwhile, China’s economic rise has created a web of mutual dependencies that makes isolating or bypassing Beijing extremely difficult. The world is gradually transforming into a more complex system in which centers of influence are distributed among Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and rising regional powers.

Most importantly, the Middle East itself is no longer what it once was. Countries in the region have become more pragmatic and more capable of diversifying their alliances. Saudi Arabia cooperates economically with China while maintaining its security partnership with America. The UAE moves flexibly between East and West. Turkey plays a balancing role between Russia and NATO. Even Iran itself is increasingly looking eastward.

In this context, Egypt stands before an important strategic opportunity. A multipolar world grants Cairo wider space for political and economic maneuver, away from the logic of sharp polarization. Egyptian-Chinese relations are expanding economically, while the security and military partnership with the United States continues. This ability to balance may become one of the most significant factors in Egypt’s strength in the coming years.

However, multipolarity does not necessarily mean greater stability. Sometimes a unipolar world is more predictable, while competition between major powers can lead to prolonged crises and open contests of influence. The real danger lies not in China’s rise alone, but in the absence of clear rules to regulate relations between the great powers in the coming phase.

The question that imposes itself here is not: “Has American hegemony ended?” but rather: “How will America behave in a world it no longer controls alone?”

Washington recognizes that Beijing has become its most serious economic competitor, yet it also understands that China’s role in global energy markets, trade networks, and regional diplomacy cannot simply be ignored. This complex relationship of rivalry and selective cooperation may become the defining feature of international politics over the next decade.

As for Iran, it is well aware of the value of its position within this equation. The higher the tension in the Gulf, the greater the importance of the Iranian role, and the greater the need for major powers to negotiate with it, directly or indirectly. Therefore, Tehran will likely continue using its regional pressure cards cautiously, without risking an all-out confrontation that could threaten the regime’s survival.

The Strait of Hormuz remains the true heart of the crisis. It is not merely a waterway, but a global energy artery through which a significant share of oil and gas exports flows. Any disruption there threatens not only the Gulf but the entire global economy. This is why the whole world watches this small area with anxiety that sometimes surpasses attention to the wars themselves.

In the end, Trump’s visit to Beijing may not be an official announcement of the end of the American era. Still, it is certainly a practical acknowledgment that the world has entered a new phase: a phase in which no power—no matter how strong—can manage international balances alone.

And perhaps this is the most important message the visit carried, far from official statements and diplomatic photographs: The world is changing… slowly, but profoundly.

Dr. Marwa El-Shinawy, Academic and Writer

The post Opinion | Trump’s Visit to Beijing Raises the Question: Is Washington Recognizing a Post-Unipolar World? first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

Iran’s Fars News Agency, citing an informed source, reported that Tehran had rejected a 14-point US proposal, describing it as an attempt to “impose surrender” while continuing a policy of coercion and threats.

According to the report, Iran would not participate in a second round of negotiations unless Washington fulfilled five key confidence-building conditions, although the details of those demands were not disclosed.

In further signs of Tehran’s increasingly hardline stance, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said “the enemies’ dreams of our people’s surrender and submission will never come true.”

Meanwhile, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a member of parliament’s national security committee, said Iran would “never give up the strategic gain of the Strait of Hormuz” and would not engage in any discussions on halting uranium enrichment.

Boroujerdi described the current ceasefire as “fragile and unreliable,” warning that clashes could resume at any moment and stressing that Tehran would not yield to US demands.

As fears of a collapse in the truce intensified, the International Energy Agency (IEA) said the world was consuming oil reserves at a record pace due to the war’s impact, forecasting a decline of around 3.9 million barrels per day in global oil supplies during 2026 because of disruptions linked to Iran.

In its monthly report, the agency said the region had already lost more than one billion barrels of oil supplies since the conflict began. It warned that a closure of the Strait of Hormuz could remove up to 12.8 million barrels per day from global markets, potentially triggering one of the largest energy shocks in decades.

Against this backdrop, several countries announced plans to contribute to maritime security arrangements in the Gulf.

Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles said Canberra would join a “purely defensive” mission led by Britain and France to secure navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, deploying a Boeing E-7 Wedgetail surveillance aircraft.

South Korea also said it was considering “gradual” support measures that could include intelligence sharing, personnel and military resources, while stressing that such involvement would not amount to direct military participation.

Italy, meanwhile, said it could deploy two warships near the Gulf, but only after a “real, credible and stable” ceasefire had been established.

India announced the launch of a $1.5bn maritime insurance guarantee fund aimed at shielding its shipping sector from war- and sanctions-related risks, underscoring growing global concern over trade security and shipping routes.

Diplomatically, Pakistan continued to play a central mediating role between Washington and Tehran, with growing backing from China.

China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi praised Islamabad’s efforts to facilitate US-Iran talks and expressed hope for a “proper solution” to the Strait of Hormuz crisis.

In the Gulf, tensions escalated further after the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait condemned what they described as an infiltration attempt by members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards on Kuwait’s Bubiyan Island, which reportedly wounded a Kuwaiti serviceman.

Meanwhile, The Wall Street Journal reported that David Barnea, head of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency, visited the UAE at least twice during the war to coordinate matters related to the campaign against Iran.

The post Iran sets tough conditions for US talks amid mounting fears over oil, shipping disruption first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

Mohammad Akbarzadeh, deputy commander of the naval forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said the geographical concept of the Strait of Hormuz was no longer confined to the traditional area around Hormuz and Hengam islands, but now extended across a broader strategic zone stretching from the coasts of Jask and Sirik to beyond Iran’s major islands.

Speaking to Iranian state television, Akbarzadeh said Tehran was monitoring US military movements in the region “with precision and capability” and would not allow attacks on its waters or interests. He added that Iran had previously “taught the Americans a lesson” during earlier tanker confrontations in the Gulf.

The remarks come amid mounting international concern over security in the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil trade passes, as tensions between Iran and the United States persist despite a fragile ceasefire reportedly mediated by Pakistan.

In a separate escalation, Ebrahim Rezaei, spokesperson for the Iranian parliament’s national security and foreign policy committee, said uranium enrichment to 90% purity “could be one of Iran’s options” if the country faced another attack, a level considered close to weapons grade.

Writing on X, Rezaei said parliament could discuss the option in the event of renewed attacks, reflecting growing pressure inside Iran for a tougher nuclear stance as diplomatic efforts falter.

On the US side, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth said the ceasefire with Iran remained in place, adding that Washington was “winning the war against Iran” and that ending it would happen “on our terms.” He also said Operation Freedom, the naval mission escorting ships through the Strait of Hormuz, could resume if President Donald Trump decides to reactivate it.

Pentagon officials meanwhile said the cost of the conflict with Iran had risen to $29bn, amid growing questions in Washington over the financial and strategic burden of prolonged military involvement in the region.

In Israel, military options against Iran’s nuclear programme returned to the spotlight after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hinted at the possibility of securing Iranian nuclear materials “either through an agreement or through special operations,” reviving comparisons with past Israeli covert operations in the region.

Regionally, Kuwait’s interior ministry announced the arrest of four men accused of belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps after they allegedly attempted to infiltrate Bubiyan Island by sea to carry out “hostile acts,” according to an official statement. Authorities said a clash with Kuwaiti forces left one serviceman injured.

Meanwhile, Qatar and Türkiye called for avoiding the use of the Strait of Hormuz as a “political or military weapon” and voiced support for Pakistan’s mediation efforts between Washington and Tehran.

Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani said during a joint press conference in Doha with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan that the region was passing through “extremely sensitive circumstances” requiring closer political and diplomatic coordination.

Pakistan also rejected US media reports claiming Iranian aircraft were present at Noor Khan Airbase, describing the reports as “misleading” and aimed at undermining ongoing mediation efforts between Tehran and Washington.

The post Iran signals possible 90% uranium enrichment, expands Hormuz posture as tensions rise first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

At the outset, several key realities must be acknowledged. Iran views the current regional landscape as temporary rather than permanent, tied largely to whatever remains of US President Donald Trump’s time in the White House – at most 30 months, including the final six months during which Trump would effectively become a “lame duck” ahead of the next presidential election. Tehran also regards the nuclear file as a supreme strategic asset that may be delayed under current pressure, but can never be surrendered – especially after the recent war reinforced the belief that, had Iran possessed a nuclear deterrent, neither Washington nor Tel Aviv would have dared to attack it.

Iran believes its nuclear programme can be technologically contained and suffocated for a limited period. Yet it also understands that once a state reaches the stage of independent technical mastery over a nuclear programme, material blockades become ineffective and may instead stimulate domestic innovation. This process was aided by neighbouring Pakistan, whose scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan previously transferred substantial nuclear expertise to Tehran. Added to this is Iran’s rugged geography, which serves as both a natural shield and a tactical advantage. The dispersal of enrichment facilities across fortified mountainous terrain and underground sites complicates aerial and satellite surveillance while significantly reducing the effectiveness of direct military action or strict international monitoring.

What applies to the nuclear file applies even more strongly to the ballistic missile programme. Both can be revived or further developed regardless of monitoring mechanisms. The real strategic prize, however, lies in controlling the Strait of Hormuz, a geopolitical opportunity Iran believes may never be repeated.

Tehran understands that Hormuz is an irreplaceable choke point. Between 20 and 21 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products pass through it daily, accounting for nearly 20% of global oil consumption and around 30% of worldwide seaborne oil shipments. More than a quarter of global liquefied natural gas trade also transits the strait annually. Any total or partial closure – or even credible threats to maritime security – could send global oil prices soaring within hours.

Although alternatives exist, including pipeline networks through Saudi Arabia and the UAE, these can absorb only a limited share of the enormous volumes passing through Hormuz, leaving much of the world’s energy supply effectively trapped behind its narrow gates.

There are also legal constraints, particularly under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which prohibits the imposition of transit fees. Article 38 guarantees all vessels the right to continuous and expeditious passage without restrictions or charges. The only exception appears in Article 42, which allows fees solely in exchange for specific services such as navigation assistance or rescue operations.

Yet since Tehran issued its threats and reportedly imposed fees on certain vessels, the model itself has begun inspiring other states that control strategic waterways.

Last April, Indonesian Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa triggered controversy when he publicly proposed charging vessels passing through the Strait of Malacca, explicitly citing the Iranian model in Hormuz. The proposal faced strong opposition from Singapore and Malaysia, forcing Jakarta to retreat. Nevertheless, the concept itself has now entered geopolitical discourse as a potential future instrument of pressure.

China, meanwhile, is watching closely. If Iran succeeds in normalising such practices, Beijing could attempt to use the precedent to justify restrictions or transit fees in the Taiwan Strait or parts of the South China Sea, treating them as internal waters or areas subject to its sovereign security jurisdiction.

The real crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz can be distilled into one fact: it is extraordinarily difficult to secure militarily. Tactically, it represents a nightmare for conventional naval forces. Cheap smart naval mines, fast suicide boats, and drones launched from concealed positions amid harsh terrain turn the very idea of fully securing the passage into an illusion. Although the United States maintains a significant naval presence in the region, it remains incapable of fully preventing “grey-zone” attacks carried out without clear fingerprints or through proxy actors. This reality forces insurance companies to impose severe restrictions – or even deny coverage entirely – compelling shipping companies to suspend operations voluntarily, thereby creating an effective blockade without a formal declaration of war.

Iran’s message is direct: paying transit fees – or even a regulated form of tribute – may ultimately prove less costly than the collapse of supply chains or the loss of oil tankers. This helps explain why major powers appear constrained in confronting such threats decisively.

Maritime traffic through the strait is estimated at roughly 3,000 ships per month under normal conditions. Imposing fees on even a fraction of these vessels could generate billions of dollars annually. Reports suggest the prospect may even have appealed to Trump himself, as a businessman inclined toward profitable arrangements, prompting discussions about a possible joint framework with Iran to organise transit tolls through the strait.

Hormuz possesses all the ingredients necessary to become a permanent gold mine for Iran – and for whichever powers manage to dominate it – provided they do not push matters so far that the world accelerates efforts to develop alternative routes and technologies capable of eventually diminishing the strait’s strategic relevance.

What may be unfolding is the emergence of a new maritime financial order built around the monetisation of security. The central question remains: could Hormuz ultimately become Tehran’s ultimate “joker card” – one capable of securing a grand bargain involving the comprehensive lifting of international sanctions and the recovery of frozen Iranian assets in exchange for guaranteeing freedom of navigation once again?

Prof. Hatem Sadek – Helwan University

The post Opinion | Hormuz: The ‘Gold Mine’ Strait first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

Trump stated that the United States would “eventually” gain access to Iran’s deeply buried uranium stockpile, adding that the US Space Force was monitoring the site. “If anyone goes near the buried enriched uranium, we will know about it and we will blow it up,” he said.

The president stressed that military operations against Iran had not fully ended, clarifying that he never declared the fighting over but only said Iran had been “defeated.” He added that Tehran had been “militarily defeated” and lacked effective naval, air, and air defense capabilities.

Trump said the United States had eliminated “three layers” of Iran’s leadership and remained capable of continuing military operations for “another two weeks” and striking additional targets inside Iran, noting that roughly 70% of Washington’s objectives had been achieved. He added that rebuilding Iran’s capabilities would take years even if strikes stopped now, reiterating that Washington would never allow Tehran to obtain a nuclear weapon. “If Iran had acquired a nuclear weapon, it would have used it against Israel and the Middle East,” he said.

Iran, meanwhile, maintained a defiant tone amid mixed signals over prospects for renewed diplomacy. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said the Iranian people would “never submit to the enemy,” insisting that talks did not mean surrender or retreat. He argued that Iran’s adversaries were trying to shift the conflict into the “economic arena” after failing militarily, urging Iranians to remain united and reduce energy consumption.

Iranian state television quoted a military spokesman as saying any new attack on Iran would be met with “new weapons, new warfare methods and new battlefields,” while another official warned that countries complying with US sanctions would “certainly face difficulties” crossing the Strait of Hormuz.

The Revolutionary Guards escalated their rhetoric, warning that any attack on Iranian oil tankers would trigger “violent” strikes on US centers and hostile ships in the region. The commander of the Guards’ aerospace force said Iranian missiles and drones had “locked onto American targets and enemy ships” and were awaiting launch orders.

Against that backdrop, Iran’s state news agency reported that Tehran had sent its response to a US proposal to end the war through Pakistani mediation, adding that negotiations at this stage would focus on ending the regional conflict.

Qatar continued its mediation efforts. The Qatari foreign ministry said Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani discussed the ceasefire and de-escalation efforts with his Saudi and Iranian counterparts. Doha stressed the need for all sides to engage with mediation efforts and address the roots of the crisis through dialogue, while emphasizing that freedom of navigation was “a non-negotiable principle.” It warned that closing the Strait of Hormuz or using it as leverage would deepen the crisis and threaten regional security.

Qatar also condemned a drone attack on a commercial cargo vessel in its territorial waters, describing it as a “blatant violation” of international law and freedom of navigation.

Meanwhile, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates said they had dealt with drones over their territories despite the ceasefire in place since April 8, highlighting the fragility of the truce and persistent security concerns across the Gulf.

The Wall Street Journal, citing informed sources, reported that Israel had established a secret military base in the Iraqi desert to support air operations against Iran and had struck Iraqi forces that came close to discovering the site during the early days of the war. The report said the base had been set up with US knowledge.

The continued hardline rhetoric from both sides, despite ongoing diplomatic contacts, suggests the current calm remains fragile and vulnerable to collapse, particularly with unresolved disputes over Iran’s nuclear program, Gulf shipping security, and the US military presence in the region.

The post Trump says US monitoring buried Iranian uranium, warns of more strikes first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

In the US, three main forces are pulling in different directions. First, Congress, both chambers, wants to avoid another endless war in the Middle East, especially since the public is weary of long, costly interventions. Second, the military establishment knows that any direct clash with Iran would not be quick or clean; it would likely open multiple fronts from the Gulf to Iraq and possibly beyond. Third, there is the electoral angle, in which every military choice is tied to the president’s image with voters, who are increasingly sensitive to fuel prices and economic security.

What we are seeing now is not truly a “withdrawal” but more a game of brinkmanship. The US administration is trying to maintain deterrence without slipping into war. The ongoing naval presence in the Strait of Hormuz and the constant threat of military action are balanced by the opening of a limited negotiating channel, a careful mix of pressure without escalation.

On the flip side, Iran is keenly reading the US stance. It knows Washington is not seeking a full-blown war, but it also cannot afford to appear as though it is backing down. Tehran is advancing calculated negotiating proposals while holding its regional influence. It is banking on time: the longer tension lingers without actual conflict, the more domestic pressure will build on the US administration.

Insights from Washington think tanks, such as the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations, highlight a complex concern. Their analyses do not describe an “end of conflict,” but rather a “repositioning phase.” The general view is that both sides have entered a sort of tactical truce, which seems more about buying time than building peace.

On the economic front, the situation is trickier than it appears. Any disruption to oil flows through the Gulf would hit the US market hard. With inflation still a serious issue at home, the administration cannot afford a military operation that might send prices soaring. Energy stability thus becomes a key, albeit hidden, factor in every decision made.

Forecasts center around three main scenarios. First, the maintenance of the current situation, neither war nor agreement, which seems most likely in the short term, as it meets the minimum interests of both sides. Second, the possibility of a limited diplomatic breakthrough, perhaps through indirect mediation, leading to a longer period of calm but without a real solution. Third, and most dangerous, is a miscalculation, an ill-timed strike or incident in the Gulf, that could quickly reignite the conflict, given the already charged atmosphere. The irony is that all parties claim they do not want war, yet their actions keep the possibility alive.

This is not so much a contradiction as a reflection of today’s international politics: managing risks rather than eliminating them. In the end, what is unfolding is neither the end of escalation nor a clear beginning, but rather a state of limbo managed with extreme precision from Washington, where every phrase is as carefully calculated as military actions.

The real question now is not whether the war has ended, but: How long can the United States maintain this tenuous balance before it is disrupted, either by choice or by chance?

Dr. Marwa El-Shinawy – Academic and Writer

The post Opinion | The Illusion of an End: Washington’s Strategy of Managing War without Fighting first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

In a letter to congressional leaders marking the expiration of the 60day War Powers Resolution deadline, Trump wrote: “There has been no exchange of fire with Iran since the ceasefire. The hostilities that began on February 28 have ended.” The statement appeared designed to reinforce the administration’s claim that ongoing operations no longer require fresh congressional authorization, after lawmakers were first notified following US strikes in late February.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said Tehran had entered the new round “in good faith and responsibility” through Pakistani mediation, despite what he described as deep mistrust of Washington due to repeated breaches of past commitments.

According to the Wall Street Journal, Iran’s revised proposal showed greater flexibility than earlier positions. Tehran suggested reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for US guarantees to halt attacks and lift restrictions on Iranian ports, with broader nuclear negotiations to follow in return for sanctions relief.

Trump, however, voiced dissatisfaction: “Iran wants to make a deal, but I’m not happy with it. The choices remain either hit them hard or reach an agreement.” His remarks underscored that the ceasefire is more a conditional truce than a final settlement, with disputes over maritime security, sanctions, and uranium enrichment still unresolved.

Araqchi has intensified diplomatic outreach, holding calls with officials from Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Russia, France, and the European Union to consolidate support for negotiations and prevent renewed escalation. Qatar reiterated that freedom of navigation in Hormuz is “nonnegotiable,” while Egypt urged continued diplomatic engagement during talks with US envoy Steve Witkoff.

Regionally, the United Arab Emirates announced that air traffic had returned to normal after a security review, signaling a relative easing of immediate threats. Meanwhile, Iran’s UN mission insisted uranium enrichment remains legal under IAEA supervision, and China rejected new US sanctions on Chinese firms tied to Iranian oil purchases, calling them violations of international law.

Despite the diplomatic track, Iranian military officials warned that renewed war remains possible. A CNN investigation reported at least 16 US military sites in eight countries across the region have been damaged since the conflict began, underscoring the fragility of the current truce.

The post Trump declares Iran war over as Hormuz, nuclear talks resume first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

In a social media post, Trump said Iran was pressing for the reopening of Hormuz while attempting to stabilize its internal leadership, though he did not specify how this message had been conveyed.

His remarks come amid reports of divisions within Washington over whether to continue relying primarily on economic pressure or to resume military strikes. Axios reported that Trump is weighing options between maintaining sanctions and naval pressure on Iran or launching new military attacks, with concerns that the United States could become mired in a prolonged strategic stalemate described as “neither war nor peace.”

US officials cited by the outlet warned that such a frozen conflict could destabilize global energy markets for months while preserving the risk of sudden escalation.

Iran, meanwhile, signaled that it does not consider the conflict resolved. An Iranian military spokesperson said Tehran had updated its target bank during both wartime and the ceasefire period, adding that Iran’s army and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintain coordinated control over the Strait of Hormuz, the IRGC securing the western side, and the regular army overseeing the eastern sector.

Iran’s defense ministry announced that future shipping through Hormuz would be subject to new security protocols aimed at safeguarding Iranian interests, describing recent US and Israeli military actions as a severe blow to trust and international law.

On the ground, Iran’s Tasnim news agency reported that the Japanese oil tanker Idemitsu Maru, carrying roughly 2 million barrels of crude, passed through the Strait of Hormuz in coordination with Iran, potentially signaling the early implementation of Tehran’s new maritime oversight framework.

Diplomatically, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi welcomed Russian support for negotiations following talks with President Vladimir Putin, highlighting the depth of their strategic partnership. Moscow has repeatedly offered mediation and previously proposed storing Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles as a de-escalation measure, though Washington rejected the idea.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated that Washington’s core objective remains preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, arguing that Tehran often uses negotiations to buy time. He stressed that any future agreement must decisively block Iran’s path to nuclear weapons capability.

The post Trump: Iran seeks swift Hormuz reopening as pressure war intensifies first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

This approach was evident in the lead-up to the second Islamabad negotiations, when Tehran conditioned its participation on lifting the naval blockade. The move embarrassed Washington and forced mediators to intervene, ultimately resulting in an extension of the truce and granting Iran additional time.

The extension has shifted the Washington-Tehran confrontation into a more intricate phase of calibrated balances and intersecting objectives–one unlikely to yield decisive gains for either side. Both are now racing against time while simultaneously seeking, to varying degrees, to avoid the trap of direct military confrontation.

If the Iranian regime has little left to lose, the so-called “Forty-Day War,” despite its high cost, has temporarily restructured the domestic front by rallying public support around the leadership in a moment of existential threat. Yet this cohesion appears contingent and may dissipate once hostilities subside. Under such conditions, the regime may come to view war itself as a strategic option–particularly if it sustains internal stability.

To clarify the stakes: even if negotiations produce an agreement on the three core files–nuclear, ballistic, and regional proxies–without the unfreezing of assets, lifting of sanctions, or support for reconstruction, the regime would still face renewed domestic backlash. This would be compounded by severe economic repercussions, damaged infrastructure, and deepening divisions among civilian, military, and clerical factions within the ruling establishment.

Herein lies Tehran’s equation: what is required is not merely a political or military agreement, but an economic payoff–one that directly improves the lives of Iranian citizens and provides the regime with a lifeline.

Time itself has thus become an additional arena of conflict. Iran leverages it to maximize its negotiating gains, while Washington seeks to compress it to achieve a political breakthrough. Between these trajectories, Tehran employs a strategy of “negotiated pressure,” manoeuvring through successive rounds of dialogue in pursuit of an agreement that appears political on the surface but delivers immediate economic dividends beneath.

In practice, the regime faces a growing challenge in maintaining internal cohesion. According to an exclusive report by Iran International, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf launched a sharp attack on opponents of a potential agreement with Washington, warning of grave consequences for the future of the Islamic Republic.

These developments have exposed a rift between the political leadership and the military establishment. Just one day after Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi signalled readiness to reopen dialogue and pursue a political settlement, forces affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targeted commercial vessels and called for a resumption of hostilities, arguing that Washington is not negotiating in good faith.

So far, Tehran’s power centres appear to regard military defeat as potentially manageable–whereas regime collapse remains entirely off the table. Accordingly, they continue to exert pressure on Donald Trump, fully aware that portions of his negotiating leverage are eroding over time.

Economically, rising oil prices have fuelled inflation–an issue flagged in reports by international financial institutions–and this, in turn, undermines the president’s domestic standing. Politically, Trump faces mounting pressure ahead of the midterm congressional elections in November, alongside declining approval ratings and growing international and Arab opposition to a return to war.

Even his remaining military options carry risks that may outweigh their potential gains. Before any escalation, Trump would need a compelling justification to re-enter combat; otherwise, such a move could be perceived as an erosion of US credibility–particularly given that most high-value military targets have already been neutralized. This was underscored by Vice President JD Vance, who stated that “the military objectives have been achieved.”

Targeting civilian, economic, or oil infrastructure would undoubtedly intensify pressure on the already strained Iranian public–but it would also carry significant ethical costs and constitute a violation of international law. Even if such considerations are not decisive for Trump, they remain potent instruments in the hands of international organizations. A strike on oil facilities, in particular, would represent a scenario with highly unpredictable and potentially severe consequences.

Trump himself appears acutely aware of the time constraint and the dangers of falling into a protracted conflict–despite publicly denying any such pressure on his platform, Truth Social. He insists that he is “under no pressure” to reach an agreement with Tehran, that “time is not against him,” and that any eventual deal will be “far superior” to the nuclear agreement concluded under Barack Obama in 2015.

In reality, however, European allies have largely left him to confront the conflict alone, while Gulf partners remain dissatisfied–arguing that he has neither decisively ended the war by toppling the regime nor adequately involved them in political negotiations to address their concerns and future vision. Most critically, he has effectively handed Tehran a highly sensitive bargaining chip: the Strait of Hormuz, which could evolve into a sustained pressure point on Gulf oil exports.

Ultimately, Iran appears inclined to prolong a state of “neither war nor peace,” treating it as a strategic space for manoeuver and attrition. This is particularly true in light of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz–through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies pass–granting Tehran the ability to raise the cost of escalation without triggering full-scale war.

Prof. Hatem Sadek – Helwan University

The post Opinion | Tehran: The Final Manoeuver first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.