In international politics, denial can occasionally be part of the game. US President Donald Trump has officially denied requesting Chinese mediation regarding Iran during his recent visit to Beijing. Yet the timing of the visit, the nature of the issues discussed, and the simultaneous escalation in the Gulf have all prompted observers to ask a larger question: Is Washington beginning to view China as a partner that can no longer be bypassed in managing Middle Eastern crises?

From this perspective, Trump’s visit to Beijing was not merely a historic encounter between two strategic rivals or a diplomatic showcase between two great powers. It reflected a deeper transformation unfolding within the international system itself. The shift is neither the collapse of America, as some imagine, nor the rise of China as a traditional replacement empire. Rather, it lies in the changing nature of power itself. Today, power is no longer measured solely by military capabilities, but also by the ability to influence markets, energy flows, supply chains, and networks of economic dependency.

Even without an officially declared mediation request, the mere linkage between Beijing, Washington, and the Iranian file reveals an undeniable reality: China has become too influential to ignore in Middle Eastern calculations. Washington, which for decades acted as the sole power capable of shaping regional balances, now finds itself operating in a world where other actors possess genuine leverage in one of the most strategically sensitive regions on earth.

China today is not merely a trading partner for Tehran; it is a vital economic artery. It is the largest importer of Iranian oil, has massive strategic investments under the Belt and Road Initiative, and holds the ability to grant Tehran economic breathing space in the face of Western sanctions. This makes Beijing—unlike many other international powers—capable of addressing Iran in the language of interests, not threats alone.

However, reading the scene as a “complete Chinese victory” would be a superficial and hasty interpretation. China itself does not—at least not yet—seek to lead the world according to the traditional American model. Beijing is highly aware that any direct confrontation with Washington could threaten the global economic stability upon which its rise depends. Therefore, China’s strategy is based on quiet expansion: economic influence, commercial penetration, long-term investments, and flexible alliances, without engaging in large-scale military adventures.

As for Trump, he operates with a mindset different from that of classical American administrations. He does not place much faith in ideological alliances or grand slogans about democracy and human rights; he believes in the language of “the deal.” His political approach is deeply pragmatic: reducing tensions when necessary, protecting economic interests, and avoiding disruptions that could destabilize energy markets or global trade flows.

Yet behind this pragmatism lies a larger, undeniable truth: America is no longer able to manage the world single-handedly as it did after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, Washington acted as the “sole pole,” capable of imposing sanctions, igniting wars, and building international coalitions without needing genuine understandings with rival powers. Today, the landscape is entirely different.

The war in Ukraine exposed the limits of Western power. The escalation in the Middle East revealed the fragility of global energy markets. Meanwhile, China’s economic rise has created a web of mutual dependencies that makes isolating or bypassing Beijing extremely difficult. The world is gradually transforming into a more complex system in which centers of influence are distributed among Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and rising regional powers.

Most importantly, the Middle East itself is no longer what it once was. Countries in the region have become more pragmatic and more capable of diversifying their alliances. Saudi Arabia cooperates economically with China while maintaining its security partnership with America. The UAE moves flexibly between East and West. Turkey plays a balancing role between Russia and NATO. Even Iran itself is increasingly looking eastward.

In this context, Egypt stands before an important strategic opportunity. A multipolar world grants Cairo wider space for political and economic maneuver, away from the logic of sharp polarization. Egyptian-Chinese relations are expanding economically, while the security and military partnership with the United States continues. This ability to balance may become one of the most significant factors in Egypt’s strength in the coming years.

However, multipolarity does not necessarily mean greater stability. Sometimes a unipolar world is more predictable, while competition between major powers can lead to prolonged crises and open contests of influence. The real danger lies not in China’s rise alone, but in the absence of clear rules to regulate relations between the great powers in the coming phase.

The question that imposes itself here is not: “Has American hegemony ended?” but rather: “How will America behave in a world it no longer controls alone?”

Washington recognizes that Beijing has become its most serious economic competitor, yet it also understands that China’s role in global energy markets, trade networks, and regional diplomacy cannot simply be ignored. This complex relationship of rivalry and selective cooperation may become the defining feature of international politics over the next decade.

As for Iran, it is well aware of the value of its position within this equation. The higher the tension in the Gulf, the greater the importance of the Iranian role, and the greater the need for major powers to negotiate with it, directly or indirectly. Therefore, Tehran will likely continue using its regional pressure cards cautiously, without risking an all-out confrontation that could threaten the regime’s survival.

The Strait of Hormuz remains the true heart of the crisis. It is not merely a waterway, but a global energy artery through which a significant share of oil and gas exports flows. Any disruption there threatens not only the Gulf but the entire global economy. This is why the whole world watches this small area with anxiety that sometimes surpasses attention to the wars themselves.

In the end, Trump’s visit to Beijing may not be an official announcement of the end of the American era. Still, it is certainly a practical acknowledgment that the world has entered a new phase: a phase in which no power—no matter how strong—can manage international balances alone.

And perhaps this is the most important message the visit carried, far from official statements and diplomatic photographs: The world is changing… slowly, but profoundly.

Dr. Marwa El-Shinawy, Academic and Writer

The post Opinion | Trump’s Visit to Beijing Raises the Question: Is Washington Recognizing a Post-Unipolar World? first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

Speaking in a Fox News interview broadcast on Friday following his visit to Beijing, Trump stated that the arms deal remains under review. “I have not approved it yet, and we will see what happens. I am keeping it on hold for now, and the matter depends on China,” he said, adding that the proposed sale is “a very good bargaining chip for us, frankly.. it is a large amount of weapons.”

The US president described the status of Taiwan as the “most important file for the Chinese president” and noted that the issue dominated their summit discussions. Emphasising that Beijing “does not want to see Taiwan independent,” Trump predicted that China would take “very strong steps” should Taipei move in that direction.

“They will face a harsh response, and bad things will happen,” Trump said. He highlighted the geographic disparity as a “difficult problem,” noting that Taiwan is situated approximately 59 miles from China, whereas the United States is about 9,500 miles away.

Trump also accused Taiwan of “stealing” the American microchip industry, asserting that previous US administrations allowed semiconductor manufacturing companies to leave the country. “If we had imposed tariffs of 100% or 200% on chips coming into the United States, we would not have lost this industry,” he stated, adding that the sector is “returning now” to the US. He subsequently called on both Beijing and Taipei to de-escalate tensions, stating: “It would be smart for Taiwan to calm down a little, and it would also be smart for China to calm down a little.. both sides should calm down.”

Prior to his interview, a Chinese government spokeswoman stated that “the Taiwan issue is the most important issue in relations between China and the United States,” warning that improper handling could lead to “clashes and even conflicts” between the two nations. The status of Taiwan, located 80 kilometres off the Chinese coast, has historically strained bilateral relations; Beijing refuses to rule out the use of force to take control of the island, whilst Washington is bound by law to provide Taipei with the means for its defence.

Trade Agreements and AI Supremacy

Reflecting on his meetings in Beijing, Trump said “the relationship was the most important thing” he took away from the summit. “It is all about the relationship. I have a very good relationship with President Xi, and with China,” he noted.

He characterised trade relations between the two countries as “very strong,” announcing that China has committed to increasing its purchases of US soybeans and acquiring commercial aircraft from Boeing. Trump specified that Xi pledged to purchase 200 large Boeing aircraft, including 777 and 737 models. He added that this figure could rise to 750 aircraft if “Boeing and General Electric engines perform well.”

Beyond trade, artificial intelligence was a central focus of the bilateral talks. Trump asserted that the United States “excels by a large margin” over China in the sector. He disclosed that the two leaders discussed the possibility of establishing “controls” to regulate the development of AI.

Describing artificial intelligence as “mostly a wonderful thing,” Trump stated he has granted AI companies the right to construct their own power stations to secure necessary energy requirements, a move he claims has bolstered the US lead over China. “Very rich companies led by many geniuses” have already begun building these power plants, he said.

Trump noted that the global competition in artificial intelligence is “primarily concentrated” between the US and China. “Who will win the artificial intelligence race? We will win it,” he declared. He added that Xi was “surprised” by the extent of American progress, explaining that Beijing initially believed it held a “massive lead,” but that the US had “caught up, and is now clearly ahead of it.”

Putin to Seek Briefings in Beijing

Following Trump’s departure, Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit China on Wednesday and Thursday. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov highlighted the significance of communication between the world’s two largest economies, stating on Friday that Russia expects to receive direct information from China regarding its talks with the United States during Putin’s visit.

The Kremlin announced in a statement that Putin’s visit, taking place at Xi’s invitation, coincides with the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, which it described as “fundamental to relations between the two states.” The 2001 agreement, signed by Putin and former Chinese President Jiang Zemin, established a long-term strategic partnership and structured economic cooperation across multiple sectors, according to Bloomberg.

Putin and Xi are expected to discuss bilateral relations and exchange views on prominent international and regional issues. Bloomberg reported that following the talks, the two sides are scheduled to sign a joint statement alongside a number of bilateral governmental agreements and other documents. Putin will also hold discussions with Chinese Premier Li Qiang regarding trade and economic cooperation.

The South China Morning Post reported previously, citing unnamed sources, that the visit is unlikely to feature formal ceremonies such as a military parade.

The trip marks Putin’s first foreign visit of the year, underscoring the close alignment between Beijing and Moscow. The two nations view one another as essential partners in a broader effort to challenge the US-led global order. Last month, Xi praised the stability of relations with Moscow and pledged to enhance bilateral coordination during a meeting with the Russian foreign minister. In early May, Putin stated that the two countries had “agreed in principle” on a high level of serious cooperation in the oil and gas sectors, adding that he intends to discuss nuclear energy with Xi during the upcoming summit.

The post Trump suspends $14bn Taiwan arms sale as ‘bargaining chip’, warns Taipei against independence bids first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

It is no coincidence that Iran, following Venezuela, has been targeted by US President Donald Trump; both countries collectively supply China with nearly 20% of its effective oil imports. These flows provide Beijing with price security and a degree of insulation from Western pressures, rendering them a strategic asset in its economic confrontation with Washington.

Undoubtedly, the blockade is primarily aimed at Iran, further exacerbating its economic strain. More than 90% of its maritime trade—both oil and non-oil—passes through the Strait of Hormuz, while its options for circumventing the blockade remain extremely limited. Should the blockade be effectively enforced, prolonged export disruptions and an inability to offload crude oil would pose a tangible operational risk to Iran’s oil fields. Once onshore storage capacities and available tankers reach saturation, forced well shutdowns may become unavoidable.

In such scenarios, aging fields may face technical risks related to reservoir integrity and declining production efficiency, potentially leading to irreversible damage. Under the weight of such losses, Tehran may resort to escalatory measures designed to raise the cost of the crisis for all parties. Among these, environmental or maritime contamination in the vicinity of the strait—reminiscent of the aftermath of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait—cannot be ruled out, with the aim of disrupting navigation and driving up global insurance and shipping costs.

Conversely, the US blockade also serves broader strategic purposes within its economic confrontation with Beijing in the Gulf region, which has increasingly become an arena of competition between the two powers. The rivalry is no longer confined to energy contracts; it now encompasses technology, renewable energy, digital currencies, and the so-called “corridors of the future,” of which the Strait of Hormuz is a critical node.

Estimates for 2026 suggest that trade between Gulf states and China is on track to exceed $325 billion by next year, surpassing the combined total of Gulf trade with the United States and Europe. China is no longer merely an energy consumer; it has become the leading technological partner in national development visions—such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030—particularly in smart infrastructure sectors. The United States, in turn, is attempting to counterbalance this influence through strategic initiatives such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), positioned as a direct competitor to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Washington has also exerted sustained pressure on Gulf states to curtail cooperation with Huawei in the domains of 5G networks and cloud computing, citing security risks to US military bases in the region—a clear red line for American policymakers. Meanwhile, Beijing has successfully secured agreements to construct large-scale data centres in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, thereby consolidating its influence in the “big data” sector, which Washington likewise views as an intelligence threat.

The year 2025 witnessed an acceleration in the use of local currencies for settling energy transactions, with some oil and gas shipments between China and Gulf states already denominated in the digital yuan. While the US dollar remains dominant, the mere existence of a viable Chinese technological alternative diminishes the effectiveness of American sanctions as a geopolitical tool—an evolution that Washington is monitoring with growing concern, given its implications for the global financial order.

In the first quarter of this year, Gulf sovereign wealth funds showed a discernible shift toward increasing investments in Chinese technology firms, while Beijing moved to localize electric vehicle manufacturing within the region.

Since Trump’s return to the White House, a primary objective has been to curb China’s accelerating technological ascent. The crises he has ignited in Venezuela and Iran—both capable of inflicting immediate and substantial damage on the Chinese economy through disruptions in oil supplies—have, paradoxically, revealed China’s preparedness to convert such challenges into opportunities. Beijing has leveraged these dynamics to reinforce its leadership in renewable energy technologies and to entrench itself as a global political power capable of filling the vacuum left by military conflicts.

China has not only managed the economic repercussions of the crisis through reliance on its strategic reserves but has also demonstrated political dexterity. From a pragmatic standpoint, it has exerted pressure on Iran to engage in negotiations in Islamabad, despite the fact that a prolonged US entanglement in the Gulf could theoretically expand China’s strategic manoeuvrability regarding its claim over Taiwan—the world’s leading producer of semiconductors. This is not a contradiction; rather, it reflects a calculated pursuit of a “controlled conflict” that exhausts the adversary without escalating into a direct confrontation that could jeopardize China’s commercial interests.

This assessment is reinforced by a recent report issued in April by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, which concluded that the US Air Force no longer possesses sufficient capacity to prevail in a direct conflict with China. The report attributes this condition to decades of underinvestment and delays in modernization programs, resulting in a fighter fleet lacking the range and survivability required to maintain air superiority against a peer competitor.

The current confrontation is no longer about “who buys oil,” but about “who sets the technological and financial rules of the region.” The intervention of China’s defence minister underscores Beijing’s recognition that the security of maritime corridors is inseparable from the security of its strategic connectivity projects, foremost among them the Belt and Road Initiative, through which China seeks to link Asia with Europe and Africa via an integrated network of land and sea routes.

The crisis surrounding the blockade and the Strait of Hormuz simultaneously advances immediate US objectives vis-à-vis Iran and broader strategic aims in its rivalry with China within the framework of “corridor competition.” What we are witnessing is the apex of global geopolitical and economic rivalry, where geopolitics has evolved from a contest over territory to a contest over connectivity; over corridors, data, energy, and supply chains.

Prof. Hatem Sadek – Helwan University

The post Opinion | The Struggle over ‘Corridors of the Future’ first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

Donald Trump’s response brought this divergence sharply into focus. While his warning to London remained largely political in tone, his message to Canada was unmistakably punitive. The threat to impose sweeping 100% tariffs on Canadian goods should Ottawa proceed with any economic rapprochement with Beijing went far beyond a conventional trade dispute. It amounted to an attempt to redraw the boundaries of what is permissible—and impermissible—within the Western alliance itself.

This posture cannot be understood outside the logic underpinning the “America First” doctrine. Within this framework, international relations are not measured by the depth of alliances but by immediate calculations of gain and loss. China, in Trump’s view, is not simply a rising economic competitor; it represents a structural threat to American dominance—across technological leadership, control of global supply chains, and even the rules governing international trade. From this perspective, any Western engagement with Beijing becomes a strategic vulnerability rather than a sovereign policy choice.

Yet this logic, however internally consistent it may appear, collides with a far more complex and less controllable global reality. Post-Brexit Britain faces economic pressures that make disengagement from the world’s second-largest economy an increasingly costly option. Canada, despite its deep and longstanding reliance on the U.S. market, has come to recognise that total dependence on a single partner in an era defined by volatility and uncertainty carries strategic risks no less serious than limited engagement with China. In this context, economic diversification ceases to be an act of disloyalty and instead becomes a mechanism for survival.

Notably, neither London nor Ottawa has sought direct confrontation with Washington or an overt crossing of red lines. Official rhetoric in both capitals has emphasised that opening channels with China does not imply a strategic realignment or abandonment of the U.S. partnership. Nevertheless, the American response suggests that even a narrow margin for manoeuvre is no longer tolerated. Herein lies the core of the crisis: when alliances shift from being partnerships rooted in mutual interests to arrangements defined by constant loyalty tests, erosion begins from within.

This erosion does not remain confined to the transatlantic sphere. The Middle East, long accustomed to navigating shifting power balances, is watching these developments with characteristic pragmatism. Growing U.S. pressure on its Western allies sends mixed signals to the region’s states. On the one hand, the United States remains an indispensable security partner; on the other, its policies appear increasingly unpredictable and more willing to weaponise economic tools for political ends. Within this relative vacuum, China finds expanding space to deepen its regional presence—through investment, technology partnerships, and even diplomatic roles once dominated by Washington.

The real danger lies not in the proliferation of partnerships or the diversification of alliances, but in the drift towards rigid polarisation. A full-scale U.S.–China trade war would not merely reshape relations between the two powers; it would disrupt global supply chains, fuel inflation, and trigger volatility in energy and food markets—costs borne disproportionately by middle-income and developing economies rather than by the major powers themselves.

Ultimately, this escalation produces no clear winners. The United States may extract short-term tactical concessions, but at the risk of undermining the trust that has sustained its alliances for decades. Its allies, meanwhile, gain greater economic flexibility, but at an uncertain political and security cost. Between these poles, a multipolar international system continues to take shape—one governed less by absolute loyalties than by delicate balances and complex calculations.

Perhaps the central lesson of this moment is that the era of unilateral dictates is receding. Managing a multipolar world cannot be achieved through tariff threats alone, but requires a more agile diplomacy—one capable of accommodating contradiction rather than suppressing it. In such a world, the defining question is no longer who we stand with, but rather: how do we move forward without being forced into a zero-sum alignment trap?

Dr. Marwa El-Shinawy – Academic and writer

The post Opinion | Britain, Canada, and China: Trump’s Tariff Strategy and the Fracturing West first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

The event opened with remarks by Marwa Alameldeen, Officer-in-Charge of UN Women Egypt; Elena Panova, UN Resident Coordinator in Egypt; and Counselor Amal Ammar, President of the National Council for Women.

“Women’s leadership in Egypt has demonstrated an exceptional ability to drive change,” said Marwa Alameldeen. “Female ministers, in particular, have set inspiring examples in good governance, policy formulation, and the implementation of programs that directly impact citizens’ lives. Today, they play a vital role in advancing development and fostering a more just and inclusive society. At UN Women, we commend the strong commitment demonstrated by Egypt’s political leadership to supporting women’s rights and empowerment as a cornerstone of sustainable development. Experience has shown that investing in women is an investment in the nation’s future.”

Elena Panova underscored the enduring relevance of the Beijing Platform, stating: “As we look toward the next phase of our shared journey, let us carry forward the spirit of Beijing with renewed determination. Let us honor the women who paved the way, support the women leading today, and inspire the girls who will shape our tomorrow. Egypt’s future—like the future of our world—is brighter, fairer, and more prosperous when women lead.”

In her opening remarks, Counselor Amal Ammar expressed her appreciation for participating in an event that brought together a distinguished group of national and international women leaders. She highlighted the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action as a historic milestone that marked a turning point in global efforts toward women’s inclusion, laying the foundation for three decades of international commitment to women’s rights and empowerment.

A key highlight of the evening was an interactive dialogue between Ambassador Mervat Tallawy, former Minister of Social Solidarity and Chair of the Contact Group on Health at the Fourth World Conference on Women, and Maya Morsy, Minister of Social Solidarity. The discussion reflected on the lasting impact of the Beijing Platform for Action and its transformative agenda. Both leaders shared personal insights from their experiences as women’s rights advocates, Ministers of Social Solidarity, and Presidents of the National Council for Women, highlighting both the progress achieved and the challenges overcome.

During the dialogue, Maya Morsy emphasized that success is rooted in collective effort, noting that collaboration among female ministers—particularly during initiatives such as the Egyptian Women’s Celebration—has been a key driver of impact. She also stressed the importance of intergenerational leadership, affirming her commitment to mentoring young women, just as she herself was supported by pioneering women leaders.

Ambassador Mervat Tallawy reflected on the achievements of the Fourth World Conference on Women, noting its success in securing significant gains for women and drawing attention to critical rights and issues. She emphasized the importance of safeguarding these achievements and continuing to build upon them.

The ceremony honored a distinguished group of women leaders, including:
Rania Al-Mashat, Minister of Planning, Economic Development, and International Cooperation; Maya Morsy, Minister of Social Solidarity; Manal Awad, Minister of Local Development and Acting Minister of Environment; Hala El-Said, Advisor to the President for Economic Affairs; Ambassador Fayza Aboul Naga, Advisor to the President for National Security; Counselor Amal Ammar, President of the National Council for Women; Ambassador Mervat Tallawy, former Minister of Social Solidarity and former President of the NCW; Ghada Waly, former Minister of Social Solidarity; Sahar Nasr, former Minister of International Cooperation; Hala Zayed, former Minister of Health; Ambassador Soha El Guindy, former Minister of Immigration and Expatriate Affairs; Ambassador Moushira Khattab, former Minister of State for Family Affairs; Aisha Abdel Hady, former Minister of Manpower; Inas Abdel Dayem and Nevine El Kelany, former Ministers of Culture; Nevine Gamea, former Minister of Trade and Industry; Yasmine Fouad, former Minister of Environment; Naglaa Al Ahwany, former Minister of International Cooperation; Nadia Zakhary, former Minister of Scientific Research; Nevine Al Kabbaj, former Minister of Social Solidarity; Nabila Makram, former Minister of Immigration and Expatriate Affairs; and the late Farkhonda Hassan, former Under-Secretary-General of the National Council for Women.

The event was attended by prominent women leaders from the private sector and civil society, as well as public figures from the media and film industries.

On the sidelines, a special exhibition showcased key milestones in UN Women Egypt’s journey—alongside its development partners—in translating Beijing commitments into tangible action and achieving positive, lasting impact in the lives of women across Egypt.

The post UN Women Egypt honors trailblazing women leaders at Beijing+30 commemoration first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

Minister Plenipotentiary for Commercial Affairs Khaled Milad Razek, Head of the Commercial and Economic Office in Beijing, participated in the “Dialogue with Shandong Enterprises within the BRICS Framework” forum, where he delivered a presentation on Egypt’s position as a preferred destination for foreign direct investment and a gateway to African, European, and Middle Eastern markets. A dynamic discussion with participating companies followed.

The ECS office also convened a roundtable in the city of Dongying, bringing together leading companies in the tyres, oil, and petrochemicals sectors. The meeting included B2B sessions and a workshop on joint manufacturing, component localisation, logistics, and supply-chain integration, with representatives from around 30 Chinese firms.

The Shandong tour concluded with participation in the “Shandong External Investment and Foreign Trade Matchmaking Conference” in Jinan, which was attended by representatives from around 60 Chinese companies. Razek delivered a detailed presentation on investment incentives in the Suez Canal Economic Zone and Egypt’s competitiveness as a manufacturing and distribution hub for regional markets.

In Hunan, the ECS office took part in the Hunan–Arab States Economic and Trade Cooperation Meeting in Changsha, which included a dedicated session to promote Egypt’s investment climate and incentives, alongside networking engagements with the province’s business community.

The visit also featured a field tour of Qilu Pharmaceutical, one of China’s leading pharmaceutical producers and a long-standing partner of major Egyptian drug manufacturers. Discussions focused on opportunities for technology transfer, local production, the establishment of an R&D centre in Egypt, and broader avenues for cooperation.

These meetings generated discussions on concrete investment opportunities in the tyres, pharmaceuticals, building materials, and glass industries, with agreement reached to organise reciprocal familiarisation and exploratory visits to Egypt in the coming period.

Shandong, China’s third-largest provincial economy, hosts major companies investing in Egypt, including Haier, Hisense, and Sailun Group. Meanwhile, Hunan is a fast-growing industrial centre specialising in construction equipment, railways, machinery, and advanced materials, and is home to the permanent China–Africa Economic and Trade Expo—an important platform for expanding cooperation between Egypt, the Arab region, and Chinese provinces.

Abdel Aziz El-Sherif, Head of ECS, said the activities fall within the broader framework of expanding economic, trade, and investment cooperation between Egypt and China. He noted that bilateral trade reached $17.378bn in 2024, underscoring the significant potential to increase and diversify Egyptian exports to the Chinese market.

He added that Chinese direct investment in Egypt currently stands at around $1.2bn, while the total value of Chinese deals and implemented investments exceeds $10bn since the beginning of the modern phase of cooperation between the two countries.

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Over the past year, the tangible benefits of membership have become increasingly apparent across multiple dimensions: economic, strategic, and research-driven. Scores of Egyptian research initiatives have secured joint funding with Russia, China, India, and Brazil in fields including artificial intelligence, clean energy, biotechnology, and advanced industries. These initiatives go beyond financial support, encompassing joint training programmes, knowledge exchange, and technology transfer—all designed to strengthen domestic capabilities and prepare younger generations for a rapidly evolving global labour market.

On the financial front, the Central Bank of Egypt has expanded currency swap agreements with Beijing, Moscow, and New Delhi, increasing the share of trade settled in Egyptian pounds, yuan, rubles, and rupees to over one-third of total transactions with BRICS nations. This has not only saved Egypt billions of dollars previously spent on the US dollar but also reduced reliance on volatile global currency markets, enhancing financial stability and the country’s resilience against international economic shocks.

In terms of major infrastructure projects, the New Development Bank has played a pivotal role by providing concessional loans for strategic initiatives—from the development and expansion of Alexandria Port’s logistical capacity to extending Cairo’s metro network to suburban areas. Simultaneously, work on the Dabaa nuclear power plant has accelerated, supported by Russian concessional financing and international expert collaborations. These projects are not merely physical achievements; they form the backbone of Egypt’s economic restructuring, boosting local manufacturing and enhancing infrastructure capable of supporting international trade.

Regionally, Egypt has leveraged its strategic location to emerge as Africa’s gateway to BRICS, exemplified by new agreements for exporting pharmaceuticals and agricultural products via trade corridors passing through India, Brazil, and South Africa, with a focus on high value-added goods. This demonstrates that membership extends beyond bolstering the national economy, positioning Egypt as a central link between Asia, Latin America, and Africa, and consolidating its role as a strategic hub in global commerce.

The Egyptian experience has showcased the country’s ability to achieve a delicate strategic balance. Rather than severing ties with the West, Cairo has transformed BRICS membership into a powerful bargaining chip with all parties. This equilibrium has enabled greater support from the International Monetary Fund and the European Union, alongside new opportunities toward the East and the Global South—evidence of a successful multipolar engagement strategy designed to safeguard Egypt’s interests without aligning exclusively with any single bloc.

Looking ahead, membership could catalyse a substantial developmental leap if several strategic initiatives are implemented: establishing joint industrial zones along the Suez Canal corridor to serve as hubs for manufacturing and exports; launching a BRICS–Egypt fund to support start-ups and domestic innovation; and developing a shared currency basket to lower financing costs and enhance financial autonomy. Moreover, integrating fintech solutions and digital transformation within major projects will increase economic efficiency and reduce reliance on conventional systems, enabling Egypt to compete regionally and globally with greater agility.

On the social front, investment in education and vocational training forms the cornerstone of Egypt’s new BRICS+ strategy. Beyond major infrastructure projects, the state aims to cultivate a new generation of engineers, technicians, and experts capable of engaging with global value chains. Comprehensive training programmes, university partnerships, and specialised technical institutes in clean energy and biotechnology are transforming knowledge into a genuine instrument of empowerment and autonomy.

Egypt’s accession to BRICS+ was not a transient political move but the commencement of a long-term trajectory linking economic strategy, foreign policy, and human capital development. With its rich history and strategic location, Egypt is no longer merely a new member of a global club; it is today a civilisational and economic bridge between continents, capable of being a genuine decision-maker rather than a passive recipient of directives. By continuing to implement this vision, Egypt can emerge as a pioneering model for countries striving for economic and strategic independence without sacrificing international relationships.

After just one year, Cairo has proven that joining BRICS+ was not a symbolic gesture but the authentic beginning of a new path toward a stronger, more independent, and sustainably prosperous republic.

Dr. Hatem Sadek – Professor at Helwan University

The post Opinion | Egypt in BRICS+: One Year of Membership – 2025 Review and Future Outlook first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

The controversy erupted after China’s consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted a comment on social media reacting to a statement Takaichi made in parliament on Friday. The prime minister had said that a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute an “existential threat to Japan,” potentially triggering a Japanese military response in self-defence.

Takaichi’s remarks followed her meeting with a Taiwanese representative at the APEC summit in South Korea earlier this month, a move that angered Beijing.

On Saturday, the Chinese diplomat shared an article from the Asahi newspaper about Takaichi’s comments and wrote above it: “If you stick that dirty neck out where it doesn’t belong, it will be cut off immediately. Are you ready?” The post was later deleted.

“Although the intent of the post was not entirely clear, it was highly inappropriate,” Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara said on Monday. He confirmed that Japan’s foreign ministry and its embassy in China had lodged a strong protest with Beijing and demanded the post be removed.

‘Existential threat’

On Monday, Takaichi defended her original statements in parliament. “Although I raised several possible scenarios, I also said that the government would make a decision on whether the situation constitutes an existential threat to Japan, taking all information into account,” she said.

While she denied saying Japan would deploy its military in such a scenario, her acknowledgement that the situation could be classified as an “existential threat” goes further than previous governments in defining how Japan might respond to a conflict over Taiwan, Bloomberg reported.

Under Japan’s pacifist constitution, the use of its military is strictly limited. However, a 2015 law reinterpreted the constitution to allow for the use of military force for collective self-defence in limited cases, including a “situation that poses an existential threat to Japan.”

In another post, the Chinese diplomat said that considering a Taiwan-related emergency an existential threat to Japan was a “fatal path chosen by foolish politicians.”

US Ambassador to Japan, George Glass, shared the deleted post on X, formerly Twitter, saying that Xue had threatened Takaichi and the Japanese people. “The mask slips… again,” he wrote.

In Beijing, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian said on Sunday that Xue’s post was a response to Takaichi’s “erroneous and dangerous” remarks about Taiwan, and demanded that Tokyo “seriously reflect on its historical responsibilities,” Reuters reported.

When asked if Japan would expel the Chinese diplomat, Kihara said Xue had made “several inappropriate statements” and that Tokyo had made multiple requests to Beijing to take appropriate action.

The post Japan, US condemn ‘threatening’ post by Chinese diplomat over Taiwan remarks first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.

In a phone call with Araghchi, Wang said the “current political process to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue is stalled, which is not in the common interest of the international community,” according to a statement from the Chinese foreign ministry. Wang also reiterated Beijing’s support for Tehran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The diplomatic push comes amid heightened tensions between Iran and the West. Tehran suspended its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) following a 12-day war with Israel in June. Iranian politicians sharply criticised the U.N. nuclear watchdog and its director, accusing the agency of providing a pretext for the Israeli attack after its board of governors passed a resolution accusing Iran of violating its non-proliferation obligations just a day before the war began.

“Iran’s regional policy and its missiles are always brought up, but we will only discuss the nuclear (file),” Araghchi was quoted as saying by Iran’s Al-Alam television. “In all previous rounds of negotiations, America has always raised the issues of missiles and the region, but our position on this matter has always been clear and firm.”

Araghchi added that “at present, there is no programme or plan for negotiations, and therefore there is no need for any mediation or mediators at this stage.”

The United Nations reimposed nuclear-related sanctions on Iran in September after Britain, France, and Germany activated the “trigger mechanism” of the 2015 nuclear deal, accusing Tehran of violating the agreement.

IAEA chief demands cooperation

Earlier on Wednesday, IAEA chief Rafael Grossi called on Iran to “seriously” improve its cooperation with U.N. inspectors to avoid escalating tensions. He criticised Tehran for not allowing inspectors access to its most important nuclear sites.

In an interview with the Financial Times, Grossi said that while the IAEA has conducted about 12 inspections in Iran since the war, it has not been allowed access to the key Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan facilities, which were struck by the United States during the June conflict.

The 12-day war, which began with Israeli airstrikes, was followed by U.S. bombing of the three underground nuclear sites using bunker-buster munitions.

Grossi stated that while the attacks caused significant damage, the fate of 408 kilograms of uranium enriched to near military-grade levels remains unclear, creating a “growing sense of need” to resume inspections. “We should have already resumed inspection work,” he said.

He noted that the IAEA was trying to handle the “turbulent” relationship with Iran with understanding, but that the country still needed to comply with its obligations. “You cannot say, ‘I am remaining within the Non-Proliferation Treaty,’ and then not comply with the obligations,” Grossi said. “Otherwise, what I will have to do is to report the loss of all visibility of these materials.”

In the meantime, the IAEA is relying on satellite imagery to monitor the bombed sites.

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According to the report, negotiators for Chinese President Xi Jinping are also pushing the US to lower tariffs on imported inputs that would be used by Chinese factories planned for construction on American soil.

The proposals were reportedly raised during trade talks in Madrid last month, where the two sides reached a framework agreement to allow the Chinese social media app TikTok to continue operating in the United States despite security concerns raised by US lawmakers.

One source told Bloomberg that Beijing had initially floated a figure of $1trn earlier this year, though the potential size of the investment currently under discussion remains unclear.

The offer is part of a set of bold demands that also includes pressure on Washington to change its decades-old stance on Taiwan, a red line for the United States.

The proposals represent a significant shift from the trade negotiations of President Donald Trump’s first term, which focused more on China’s purchases of US exports than on investments within the US, an area subject to strict national security reviews.

A White House spokesperson declined to give a direct response to Bloomberg, stating that the administration is currently focused on ensuring China adheres to its existing commitments under the “Phase One” trade deal. The spokesperson added that Washington continues to engage with Beijing with the goal of securing a level playing field for American companies, farmers, and workers.

In March, the world’s top two economies have edged closer to a trade war after Trump slapped more tariffs on all Chinese goods. China quickly retaliated, imposing 10-15% tariffs on US farm products.

“If war is what the US wants, be it a tariff war, a trade war or any other type of war, we’re ready to fight till the end,” China’s embassy said on X, reposting a line from a government statement at the time.

In June, China accused the United States of “provoking new economic and trade frictions” as it responded to US President Donald Trump’s claims that Beijing had violated a trade truce agreed by the two nations last month, which paused their blistering tariff war.

“A huge concession to Beijing”

It remains unclear whether President Trump will accept the Chinese offer ahead of a potential summit with President Xi in South Korea later this month, though one source indicated that Washington has “not ruled out any option yet.”

Questions remain about the size and structure of any potential investment commitments. The model used for the TikTok deal, which grants US control over the Chinese entity’s operations within the United States, could be one option.

The proposal has already drawn criticism in Washington. Republican Representative John Moolenaar, chairman of the House select committee on China, warned that China “routinely cheats in its dealings with the United States” and cautioned against easing investment restrictions.

“China has used its market and companies as a weapon against us for decades, and we cannot allow those companies to gain more access to our economy,” he said.

Matt Pottinger, a former US deputy national security adviser, described allowing a massive flow of Chinese investment into the American economy as “a huge concession to Beijing.”

“It would be tantamount to the United States joining the Belt and Road Initiative, and perhaps even becoming its final destination,” he said.

Rebalancing economic relations by attracting major investment flows to the US has been a cornerstone of Trump’s second-term trade strategy. He has repeatedly stated that the country has attracted $17trn in investment commitments since he took office in January and that his top priority with China is “frankly, and most importantly, to reach a big deal.”

Investment flows slow

A potential Chinese investment of $1 trillion or more would dwarf commitments from other countries to the US during Trump’s second term. The European Union has committed to $600bn in investments over the next four years, while Japan has pledged $550bn.

Any deal to open the door to significant Chinese investment would mark a sharp reversal of the policies adopted by both Washington and Beijing over the past decade. After peaking at a record $57bn in 2016, Chinese investment in the US has slowed dramatically, reaching just $2.1bn in the first half of 2025, according to data from Rhodium Group.

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), led by the Treasury Department, has been central to these restrictive efforts, blocking a Chinese acquisition of the money transfer company MoneyGram and forcing the sale of the dating app Grindr by a Chinese investor, citing security risks in each case.

The post China dangles $1trn investment in bid to reset US trade policy: Bloomberg first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.